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Abstract
This essay argues that the Constitution contains a number of useful and innovative recommendations. Although a number
of practical challenges in implementing the recommendations can be predicted, their implementation will leave the EU a more
able and coherent actor on the international stage. The passage of the Constitution through the various national referenda is
not seen as a significant factor since a number of aspects are already being implemented by intergovernmental agreement and
this determination will in all likelihood continue into other areas of external relations. Finally, the essay concludes by cautioning
that greater efforts are required to communicate to global partners, notably the United States, what type of actor the EU wishes
to become, should all of the reforms discussed below be implemented. There is a need to link strategy, institutional reform
or innovation, with clearer public diplomacy.
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The draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
contains a number of innovations which carry the
potential to fundamentally change the way in which EU
external relations operate.1  It may be helpful to recap
briefly why the need for fundamental change in EU
external relations was felt to be necessary – aside from
the stated purpose of preparing the European institutions
for enlargement to twenty-five. The Convention mem-
bers found early agreement that it was ‘important for the
EU to be a strong, effective and efficient player on the
international scene’. Many also believed that the Union’s
performance in external relations ‘fell short of expec-
tations, especially when considering its economic and
financial weight’.2  This reflected the common adage
that the EU is an economic giant and political pygmy
and, as George Robertson, then NATO Secretary-General,
put it, the Union is a flabby giant.3 The Convention
deliberations were also influenced by wider political
considerations such as the ‘impression of living in a
unipolar world where the U.S. sets the tone’.4  The latter
point signified that the Convention was also implicitly
about what type of international actor the EU wishes to
be and what relations it envisages with its key inter-
national partners.
The arguments presented below do not underestimate
the significance of EU enlargement, but enlargement is
seen as a catalyst rather than a cause of change in the fields
discussed. For instance, the initial inadequacies of the EU
in addressing the successive shocks emanating from the
Western Balkans in the 1990s set the backdrop for many
of the debates in the Convention’s working group on
defence. The appearance of the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP) at the end of 1998, following an
Anglo-French initiative, signalled not only the EU’s
growing awareness of the importance of being able to
fulfil a variety of peacekeeping roles (known as the
‘Petersberg tasks’), but also the importance of being able
to act more autonomously in the face of apparently
declining interest in Europe from across the Atlantic.
A broad and partially overlapping set of issues was
also faced by the working group on external action
whose chief concern related to the often incoherent
image – and sometimes even incoherent policies – of the
Union in its external relations. This was in part a con-
tinuation of traditional intergovernmental and commu-
nautaire themes in EU external relations; more impor-
tantly it marked recognition that many of the challenges
facing the Union (terrorism, global poverty, access to
energy resources, efforts to curtail the spread of weapons
of mass destruction, post-crisis reconstruction and so
forth) demand more effective inter-pillar coordination
and leadership. These factors put the burden of reform
principally upon the Union’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) but also upon efforts to strengthen
the consistency of external relations as a whole.
Innovation or Evolution?
The main innovations to be considered below are the
introduction of the post of Union Minister for Foreign
Affairs and the European External Action Service (EEAS)
which assists the Minister. The Constitution also intro-
duces a number of different forms of flexibility or
cooperation, notably in the Common Security and
Defence (CSDP) area. The introduction by the European
Council of the ‘Solidarity Clause’ in the event of terrorist
attacks (shortly after the Madrid bombings), or the
launch of the European Defence Agency, reminds us
that some aspects of the Constitution can proceed by
intergovernmental agreement.5 There are, however,
limitations since some changes, such as those relating
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Constitution. Objections on political grounds can also
be predicted if parts of the Constitution are adopted by
salami tactics, regardless of the outcome of the various
referenda in the Member States.
A first glance at the Constitution shows that, sensibly,
external relations are now mainly grouped under a new
Title V (The Union’s External Action).6  This serves to
remind the reader of the importance of consistency
across the all aspects of the Union’s external relations
(development, humanitarian aid, commercial policy,
restrictive measures, agreement with international
organisations and third
parties and the common
foreign and security
policy). It is, however,
interesting to note in pas-
sing that the Union’s rela-
tions with its neighbouring
countries, which aim to
‘establish an area of pros-
perity and good neighbour-
liness’, are addressed separately.7 This is again sensible,
since it clearly communicates the idea that the Union’s
neighbours enjoy a ‘special relationship’ which opens
up the possibility of 'reciprocal rights and obligations'
as well as joint activities.
In spite of the reorganization of the existing treaties
and the introduction of new material, the fact that the
pillars remain cannot be disguised. CFSP remains quite
distinct from the communautaire aspects of decision-
making in external relations. Yet it would be simplistic
to dismiss the Constitution as a repackaging exercise or
to maintain that the pillar structure is completely un-
touched. Whilst some aspects of external relations are
evolutionary, notably those that have proven historically
resistant or sensitive to change, others are innovative,
such as the emergence of a Union Minister for Foreign
Affairs or an European External Action Service. The
challenge is therefore to find ways in which the
evolutionary aspects can accommodate innovation.
The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs –
A Response to Kissinger?
No less that three designs for what became the position of
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs were on the table at the
commencement of the Convention and, unsurprisingly,
debate focused on this proposal.8 Although the survival
of the nomenclature ‘minister’ is somewhat surprising,
the position that resulted from the Convention debates
has the potential to be extremely influential – he will
undoubtedly be the main ‘telephone number’ to phone
when, along the lines of Kissinger’s apocryphal question,
you wish to speak to Europe from outside.
According to the Constitution the EU Foreign
Minister shall ‘conduct’ the Union’s CFSP (and hence the
Common Security and Defence Policy as well). The
Union Foreign Minister shall also ‘preside over’ the
Foreign Affairs Council (see below). In his Commission
persona, he shall be ‘responsible within the Commission
for responsibilities falling to it in external relations and
for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external
action’.9  The use of the word ‘conduct’ in the CFSP
context and the words ‘responsible for’ and ‘coordi-
nating’ in the Commission context signify a difference in
the respective roles of the Union Foreign Minister. In
effect, the Minister’s role reflects the current respon-
sibilities of the CFSP High Representative and the
Commissioner for External Relations. It is clear that the
most difficult adjustments in the Minister’s double role
will have to be made on the Commission side, which
operates as a college. One of
the immediate issues is to
reach a determination over
who or what is to be coordi-
nated (at a minimum the
current RELEX DG and at a
maximum the external rela-
tions aspects of trade, deve-
lopment, enlargement as
well as the EuropeAid Co-
operation Office and Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)).
Inevitably the ‘double-hatted’ nature of the office risks
raising suspicions about whether this is fundamentally a
Council person in the Commission, or vice versa.
The extensive nature of the Union Foreign Minister’s
duties, which also include representational duties (in
the CFSP context), conducting political dialogue,
consultation with the European Parliament, the super-
vision of a ‘start-up’ fund for urgent initiatives in the
CFSP area, and the organization of coordination amongst
the Member States in international organisations, has
given rise to doubts about overload.10 Although this
remains a concern that cannot be lightly dismissed, the
burden depends in part upon the type and extent of
assistance that the EEAS can give, as well as upon the
personality of the Minister himself. The agreement that
the first Union Foreign Minister should be the current
High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, who
commands widespread respect throughout the Union
and beyond, has helped reassure sceptics that the post
is (at least initially) in capable hands.11
Solana’s personal charm and tact will be required to
establish good working relations with a number of other
personalities who will assume significant external action
responsibilities. This will apply in particular to the
Commission, once the division of the external relations
mandates and the respective nationalities and
personalities behind them becomes clearer. It will also
apply to the European Council President who shall ‘at
his or her level and in that capacity ensure the external
representation of the Union on issues concerning the
common foreign and security policy, without prejudice
to the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’.12
Bearing in mind that the Union Foreign Minister ‘shall
represent the Union’ for CFSP-related matters, the
distinction between the representational roles rests upon
a clear understanding of level and capacity.13  It has to
be questioned though whether this distinction will
always be so apparent in practice.
In spite of the reorganization of the
existing treaties and the introduction
of new material, the fact that the
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… and the ‘Ministry’
The presence of a ‘minister’ in the Constitution leads to
the natural assumption that there will be a quasi-ministry.
The ‘ministry’ exists in the form of the European External
Action Service (EEAS) which ‘shall work in cooperation
with the diplomatic services of the Member States and
shall comprise officials from the relevant departments of
the General Secretariat of the Council and of the
Commission as well as staff seconded from national
diplomatic services of the Member States’.14  The precise
organisation and functioning of the EEAS remains to be
determined (by a European decision of the Council)
and, until such time, a number of issues stand out. The
EEAS assists the Union Foreign Minister but, beyond
that, the place of the Service
in the institutional com-
position of EU’s external
action institutions remains
vague. The reference to
‘relevant departments’ of
the General Secretariat of
the Council presumably
refers to DG-E, but also to
the Policy Planning and
Early Warning Unit (the
Policy Unit) which reports
directly to the High Repre-
sentative for CFSP. Be-
yond this it is unclear how, or whether, the crisis
management aspects (such as the EU Military Staff, the
Police Unit or Civcom) relate to the EEAS.
The main institutional struggles are likely to be
manifest on the Commission side since it is far from clear
what constitutes ‘relevant’ departments. Until further
guidelines are issued it is only possible to sketch
minimalist and maximal versions of the EEAS. At the
low end of the spectrum the EEAS could comprise a
limited number of units from the Council Secretariat,
DG RELEX and the current External Service. The
possible benefit of a modest EEAS may be primarily
internal since the Commission is still adjusting to reforms
made in November 2000 and further dramatic upheaval
could therefore be counterproductive. However, a modest
reorganization, if accompanied by extended demands
upon the new service, may lead to concerns that the
‘foreign policy’ generalists are ill-equipped to address
the often technical and detailed aspects of development
policy or humanitarian aid which has been the primary
focus of Community external relations.15
The higher end of the spectrum is far more ambitious
since it would incorporate all of the foreign policy units
from the Council Secretariat, all of the External Action
DGs from the Community, the Union Delegations as
well as EuropeAid and ECHO. Again, there are pros and
cons to such a scenario. The advantages would lie in the
size of the EEAS and the possibility for specialization
within the service, thus obviating fears of marginalization
for one of more aspects of external policy. The dis-
advantages would lie in the considerable institutional
upheavals involved and the inevitable turf battles over
priorities within external relations. The emergence of
such a service could pose its own formidable coordination
problems and it is unclear what the reaction of the
Member States (notably the larger ones) to the emergence
of such a service might be.
Legal Personality
A further development of relevance to the above
discussion is the effect of the assumption by the Union
of legal personality.16  Under the Constitution this would
permit the Union to ‘conclude an agreement with one or
more third countries or international organisations’ as
well as association agreements.17  In non-CFSP areas the
Commission will submit a
recommendation to the
Council, which shall adopt
a European decision autho-
rizing the opening of nego-
tiations. The Council may
address directives to the
negotiator or designate a
special committee (such as
the Article 133 Committee
for agreements in the com-
mon commercial policy)
and shall adopt a European
decision authorising the
signing of an agreement. Prior to adopting a European
decision the Council must obtain the consent of the
European Parliament for a number of agreements (such
as those with important budgetary implications, those
addressing a specific institutional framework or in those
cases where the fields are covered by the ordinary
legislative process).
The procedures for drawing up international agree-
ments remain broadly the same in the non-CFSP areas,
but with enhanced powers for the European Parliament.
When the envisaged agreement relates ‘exclusively or
principally’ to CFSP, the Union Foreign Minister submits
recommendations to the Council.18 Aside from again
distinguishing between the ‘pillars’, the arrangements
for reaching international agreements invest consider-
able powers in the Union Foreign Minister. The challenge
will clearly be in distinguishing what falls ‘principally’
in the CFSP area.
The assumption by the Union of legal personality
would also open up the possibility of the current External
Service of the Commission becoming a fully-fledged
corps diplomatique of the Union. The Community’s
128 delegations would no longer be confined to
Community external relations, but be fully competent
(subject to addressing the issues raised above regarding
staffing) to address the full range of Union external
relations. This would be especially welcome since, with
the involvement of seconded national diplomats, it
would offer those EU Member States with smaller
diplomatic services a significant multiplier effect in
their representation (albeit under the EU rubric, but one
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that may be preferable to reliance upon a larger EU
Member State) and enhance the ability to identify
common (European) interests between the Member
States. It would also be welcome on the grounds that the
current  communautaire-intergovernmental divisions
within EU external relations have become increasingly
artificial with, as discussed above, many issues
demanding a cross-pillar approach.19
Finally, the assumption by the Union of legal
personality will exacerbate the problem of how the EU
represents itself in a variety of international organisations
(either in 25+1 format or, very occasionally, as the EU
itself). This will be of particular significance in the
context of the ongoing debates about how to restructure
the UN Security Council and other UN-related bodies.
Of Democratic Deficits …
One of the consistent complaints regarding CFSP has
been the lack of democratic scrutiny and thus legitimacy.
The European Parliament has traditionally played a
rather marginal role in CFSP and its more recent crisis
management aspects. It has become increasingly difficult
for the Parliament (let alone citizens) to gain access to
information in the more sensitive CFSP areas. Under an
interinstitutional agreement of November 2002 the
President of the European Parliament and the chair of the
Foreign Affairs Committee are entitled to request infor-
mation from the Presidency or the High Represen-
tative.20  More generally, the question of legitimacy has
assumed growing prominence both in general terms
related to the EU as a whole, and more specifically in the
CFSP context. The expansion of the EU’s activities into
a variety of crisis management roles has also led to
demands for improved Parliamentary participation
(without wishing to be melodramatic, few things are
more serious than potentially being asked to lay down
your life for an EU mission).
Broadly speaking the European Parliament’s powers
vis-à-vis CFSP have not
changed significantly
since the Maastricht treaty,
with the exception of the
budgetary stipulations.
The European Parliament
has often been critical of
the consultation rights
they have with the Presi-
dency and the Council,
especially the latter when
they submit their annual
report on CFSP (the last report in October 2003 was
dismissed as a ‘book-keeping exercise’).21  Relations
between the High Representative for CFSP and the
Commissioner for External Relations seem more positive
since both appear regularly either before the Parliament
or the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET).
The European Parliament’s main leverage over CFSP
has traditionally been through the budget, or more
specifically the operational expenditure.22  The process
of agreeing on CFSP expenditure is through a trialogue
procedure, involving the Parliament, the Commission
and the Council. The Parliament’s role in this sphere has
also been strengthened in those circumstances when the
CFSP budget has proven insufficient (especially in
2003 with the assumption by the Union of responsibility
for a variety of different crisis management operations).
In this case the Council and the Commission must find
a solution with Parliament’s approval. In a similar vein
the increasing emphasis on civilian aspects of crisis
management has given the Parliament another form of
budgetary oversight.
The European Parliament’s relations with ESDP
remain problematic, in part since they are not the only
‘Parliament’ involved (the Assembly of the Western
European Union, which is composed of national parlia-
mentarians, is also active in this area) but also due to the
restricted access to information in this area. The WEU
Assembly proposed to link their founding treaty, the
1954 Modified Brussels Treaty, to the European Consti-
tution by means of a protocol, and then to establish a
forum consisting of the Conference of European Affairs
Committees (COSAC) and the WEU Assembly. Although
the details of this debate are beyond the limited confines
of this piece, it nevertheless raised the important linkage
between the national and European levels that are
necessary for effective oversight in this area. It is also
worth noting that the WEU Assembly claims to be ‘the
only interParliamentary body that effectively monitors
ESDP, with 50 years of established experience … the
control of the European Parliament is not sufficient
since it is limited to an exchange of information between
the EU institutions rather than proper scrutiny and
national Parliaments will remain outside the ESDP
decision-making process’.23
In spite of the presence of Parliamentary scrutiny as
an item on the Convention’s agenda, the actual changes
that were introduced into the Constitution were relatively
modest. The European Parliament shall ‘be regularly
consulted’ on the main
aspects and basic choices
of CFSP and ESDP and
‘shall be kept informed of
how it evolves’.24 The
Union Foreign Minister
shall also consult and
inform the European Par-
liament and Special Repre-
sentatives may also be
involved in briefing the
Parliament.25 The Parlia-
ment also has the right to ask questions of the Council
and the Minister and to make recommendations to them.
The Commission as a whole, which includes the
Union Foreign Minister as a Vice-President of the
Commission, is ‘responsible’ to the European Parlia-
ment.26  The Parliament may censure the Commission
and, if the motion is carried, the Commission is obliged
to resign as a body. It is reasonable to anticipate that the
European Parliament will use this stipulation to empha-
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sise the Commission’s accountability to the Parliament
and, as part of the college, that of the Union Foreign
Minister. Although it is difficult to foresee dramatic
problems at this point in time, especially with the
minister’s post in Solana’s hands, it is easier to see
potential for friction on budgetary matters. Under the
Constitution, provision is made for ‘rapid access to
appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing
of initiatives’ in the CFSP framework. 27  In this context
the European Parliament shall be consulted – it cannot,
in other words, block the
Council’s decision on this
matter. The procedures for
establishing, administe-
ring and the control of the
financial procedures stem
from the Union Foreign
Minister. The Constitution
would therefore appear to
have created a separate,
parallel budgetary struc-
ture outside Parliamentary
scrutiny.
The second main challenge for the European Parlia-
ment in the CFSP area will be its relations with national
parliaments. Under a protocol annexed to the Con-
stitution, COSAC may ‘submit any contribution it deems
appropriate for the attention of the European Parliament,
the Council of Ministers and the Commission. That
Conference shall in addition promote the exchange of
information and best practice between Member States’
Parliaments and the European Parliament, including
their special committees’. The Conference may also
‘organise interparliamentary conferences on specific
topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign
and security policy and of common security and defence
policy’.28
Although it is too early to predict with any certainty
how the European Parliament might operate under the
terms and conditions of the Constitution, it is apparent
that the potential for friction on budgetary issues exists,
notably through the possibility of parallel budgets
emerging in the CFSP area outside the Parliament’s
scrutiny. The second possibility is that the ‘democratic
deficit’ in the CFSP area may be answered, at least
partially, not by investing the European Parliament
with significant extra powers of oversight or scrutiny,
but rather by greater involvement of the national
parliaments and other specialised bodies, such as the
WEU Assembly.
Expanding Petersberg and Grappling
with Capabilities
There are a number of developments that deserve brief
mention with regard to the Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) which, the Constitution notes
rather unhelpfully, is an ‘integral part of the common
foreign and security policy’. The Constitution updates
the original Petersberg tasks to include ‘joint disarma-
ment operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military
advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and
peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken
for crisis management, including peace-making and
post-conflict stabilisation’.29 The significance of this is
two-fold: first, it more accurately portrays what the EU
is actually doing on the ground (based on operations
conducted in 2003 and since) and; second, it places
more emphasis upon the coordination of the civilian
and military aspects of crisis management, which falls
to the Union Foreign Minis-
ter under the authority of
the Council.
One of the key chal-
lenges with regard to the
CSDP is the capability
shortcomings that the EU
Member States face in
executing the Petersberg
tasks. Although there is an
arrangement with NATO
whereby the EU can borrow
assets from NATO (the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements),
there is still a need for substantial national effort to
address the shortcomings which, given the overlapping
membership of the organisations, is largely a shared
problem. The solution currently being developed on the
EU side (and to be completed by the end of 2004) is the
creation of a European Armaments, Research and
Military Capabilities Agency (mercifully just called the
European Defence Agency). The key tasks of the Agency
were established at the Thessaloniki European Council
and adopted by the Council in a joint action include the
following:30
a. to develop defence capabilities in the field of crisis
management;
b. to promote and enhance European armaments
cooperation;
c. to strengthen the European industrial and techno-
logical base;
d. to create a competitive European defence equipment
market as well as promoting research aimed at
leadership in strategic technologies for future
defence and security capabilities.
Although the aims of the Agency are laudable, it
remains to be seen whether the key potential players
(notably France and the United Kingdom) share the
same view of the Agency’s core competencies.31 The
institutional relations with other similar bodies such as
OCCAR, WEAG/WEAO and the LoI process,32 also
have to be clarified since the Council joint action
referred to above refers to ‘assimilation or incorporation
of relevant principles and practices as appropriate’
while avoiding the issue of what type of relationship
should have with these bodies or processes in the mid to
longer term (especially given the predominant EU
membership in each case). Relations with the non-EU
members of the above-mentioned organisations (Norway
and Turkey) and the agency will also have to be
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clarified.33  Although it is clear that the Commission will
play an important role in the Agency (it is ‘fully
associated’, as with CFSP generally) it is vital that the
Commission’s growing role in this area, and in particular
its influence in shaping the type of technology that may
be relevant, is carefully coordinated with that of the
Agency so that they may move in tandem.34  It can also
be pondered what reactions might be provoked from
across the Atlantic to an agency that espouses the aim
of leadership in strategic technologies.
Cooperation in its Many Guises
One the frequent complaints regarding CFSP is the con-
sensus-driven nature of the pillar. This runs the danger of
either paralysing CFSP, when consensus cannot be
reached, or provides incentives for the larger Member
States to work outside CFSP. This has led to demands for
greater use of qualified-majority voting and more flexible
forms of cooperation. Progress on the former has been
marginal while the Constitution introduces several new
forms of cooperation.
Aside from enhanced cooperation, which applies to
all pillars but with special arrangements for CFSP, the
Constitution also allows for ‘permanent structured coope-
ration’ which is open to those Member States ‘whose
military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have
made more binding commitments to one another in this
area with a view to the most demanding missions’.35  A
separate protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation
notes that it is open to any Member State who may wish,
to ‘proceed more intensively to develop its defence
capacities through the development of its national
contributions and participation, where appropriate, in
multinational forces, in the main European equipment
programmes, and in the activity of the European agency
in the field of defence capabilities development, research,
acquisition and armaments’.36
The protocol also clarifies what is meant by ‘higher
capacities’ which, in order to be included, obliges the
Member State to ‘have the capacity to supply by 2007 at
the latest, either at national level or as a component of
multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the
missions planned, structured at a tactical level as combat
formations, with support elements including transport
and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred in
Article III-210 [now III-309 which refers to the Petersberg
tasks], within a period of 5 to 30 days, in particular in
response to requests from the United Nations Organisation,
and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days
and be extended up to at least 120 days’.37
The Council may also ‘entrust the execution of a
[Petersberg] task, within the Union framework, to a group
of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values
and serve its interests’.38 Examples of this type of
arrangement already exist, such as the French led military
operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
mid-2003. Presumably, there is a link between those who
fulfil ‘higher criteria’ and those who are likely to be
entrusted with the execution of a task. Key in this regard
are France and the United Kingdom, who have the most
substantial and expansive capabilities.
… The Path to a Common Defence?
Defence has been one of the most sensitive areas of
European integration and subject to frequent disagree-
ments since the Second World War. The Treaty on
European Union reflects the sensitive nature of defence
when it refers to ‘the progressive framing of a common
defence policy…which might lead to a common defence,
should the European Council so decide’.39  By way of
contrast the Constitution also refers to ‘the progressive
framing’ of a common Union defence policy, but then
states that ‘this will lead to a common defence, when the
European Council, acting unanimously, so decides’.40
As with the original treaty there are caveats regarding
the ‘specific character of the security and defence policy
of certain Member States’ (in other words, neutrality or
non-alignment) as well as the ‘obligations of certain
Member States, which see their common defence realised
in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’.41  These caveats
are restated in a striking new paragraph which states that,
‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on
its territory, the other Member States shall have towards
it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter’.42  In spite of the caveats, such a clause
has the potential to complicate relations with NATO
(since the majority of EU members see their common
defence realised through that organisation) as well as
those with the WEU.
In the case of the latter, the mutual defence references
in the Constitution, quoted above, are remarkably similar
to those appearing in Article IV-V of the Modified Brussels
Treaty establishing the WEU. However, the obligations
are stronger in the latter and no specific mention is made
in the former to military means, just ‘aid and assistance’.
The Constitution thus appears to be an exhortation rather
than a specific obligation, such as that implied by the
Modified Brussels Treaty. However, since all ten members
of the WEU are EU members, it may well have the effect
of further diluting the mutual defence obligations assumed
under the Modified Brussels Treaty or, for that matter,
those appearing in the Washington Treaty establishing
NATO. The diluted wording of the Constitution leaves
open the question of how the defence of those EU members
who are not NATO members (Austria, Cyprus, Finland,
Ireland, Malta and Sweden) should be guaranteed. Due to
the historical and political sensitivity of this issue, the
Intergovernmental Conference went as far as it could but,
even in the unlikely event of territorial aggression against
one or more EU Member States, the issue of how the EU
should assume military responsibility for the defence of
its members remains open.
Conclusions
The Constitution contains a number of innovations which
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external relations. Many of the changes mentioned above
could be introduced by intergovernmental agreement,
regardless of the actual fate of the Constitution. There is
also the potential for friction which accompanies any
major changes to existing practice; in this regard the
European External Action Service is of particular note, as
are the procedures for the rapid access to financing of
CFSP initiatives. As
with other aspects of
external relations
though, much remains
to be done beyond the
Constitution in terms
of filling in the (con-
siderable) blanks.
The implications of the Constitution are not solely
limited to the EU and it is therefore important to consider
how the adaptations and innovations discussed above
might change the EU as an actor on the international
scene. For instance, it is unclear whether the Constitu-
tional changes are effectively designed to promote a
European superpower and, if so, what may be in mind
regarding relations with significant third parties such as
China or the United States. An obvious place to start
would be by placing the Constitutional innovations in
the external relations area more firmly in the context of
Solana’s A Secure Europe in a Better World: European
Security Strategy than has been done thus far.
If the Constitution is to be effective, it is apparent that
more attention needs to be paid to public diplomacy and,
in the case of external relations, that includes defining the
EU’s global role. According to the ‘security strategy’, the
EU should be more active in pursuing its strategic
objectives, more capa-
ble and more coherent.
The Constitution has
pointed the way for-
ward on several of this
points, but it remains
true that there are few
problems that the EU
can address on its own. The EU needs partners and it needs
to communicate to them what kind of partner is emerging
from the Constitution. Clearly, one of the biggest and
most immediate challenges is to establish ‘an effective
and balanced partnership’ with the United States.43  The
Convention met to consider how to make the Union more
capable and coherent. The Convention and the resultant
Constitution have contributed towards these goals. The
rest is up to the Member States, including the very
question of whether the Union has a Constitution or not.
Much remains to be done beyond
the Constitution in terms of filling
in the (considerable) blanks.
_________
NOTES
1 In all cases the ‘Constitution’ that is referred to is the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe, CIG 87/04, 6 August 2004.
2 Summary Report of the Plenary Session, 11-12 July 2002,
CONV 2002/02, Brussels, 16 July 2002. Para. 5.
3 The context in which Robertson used this phrase was as follows:
‘This European continent...is still a flabby giant with huge
military expenditure, enormous paper armies, large amounts
of equipment, all of which are completely useless for dealing
with tomorrow’s crises’. Andrew Beatty, ‘Plan for hike in
defence expenditure’, EU Observer, 17 February 2004, at
http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?sid=9&aid=14515.
4 Hanner Farhleitner and Gerhard Tusek, A Common Foreign
Policy for the European Union, Annex, Preliminary Draft
Constitutional Treaty, CONV 369/02, 16 July 20002, p.1.
5 The ‘Solidarity Clause’ appears at Article I-43 of the
Constitution but was adopted by the European Council in its
Declaration on Combating Terrorism on 25 March 2004 in
Brussels, while the European Defence Agency (Articles I-
31 and III-311) is scheduled to be launched by the end of the
Dutch Presidency.
6 CIG87/04, Part III, Title V, ‘The Union’s External Action’.
7 Ibid. Article I-57.
8 See Simon Duke, ‘The Convention, The Draft Constitution
and External Relations: Effects and Implications for the EU
and its International Role’, Romanian Journal of European
Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3, September 2003, p.41.
9 CIG 87/04, Article I-28.
10 On the emergency fund see CIG87/04, Article III-313, Para. 3.
11 Press Release, 2595th Council Meeting, Heads of State or
Government, 10995/04 (Presse 214), 29 June 2004.
12 CIG87/04, Article I-22, Para.2.
13 CIG87/04 Article III-296, Para. 2.
14 Ibid. Article III-296, Para. 3.
15 This issue is raised in James Mackie, Heather Baser, Jonas
Frederiksen and Oliver Hasse, Ensuring that Development
Cooperation Matters in the New Europe, ECDPM, October 2003.
16 CIG 87/04, Article I-7.
17 Ibid. Article III-323-324.
18 Ibid. Article III-325, Para. 3.
19 The five key threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised
crime) identified by Solana in his European Security Strategy,
A Secure Europe in a better world, in December 2003 are all
inherently interpillar.
20 Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between
the European Parliament and the Council concerning access
by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the
Council in the field of security and defence policy, OJ C 298/
01,30 November 2002.
21 Seem Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament
on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, Rapporteur,
Elmar Brok, A-5-0348/2003, 8 October 2003, p.7.
22 Under the terms of the 1999 Interinstitutional Agreement the
operational expenditure of CFSP is covered by sub-section
B8 of the EC budget, while administrative expenditure falls
under the Coucil’s budget and is thus not subject to
Parliamentary interference.
23 Armand de Decker, Chairman of the Belgian Senate, President
of the WEU Assembly, in Tackling the ‘Double Democracy
Deficit’ and Improving Accountability of ESDP, Conferencehttp://www.eipa.nl Eipascope 2004/3 37
Report, 29 April 2004 (Brussels, European Parliament), p. 4.
24 CIG97/04, Articles I-40, Para.8 and I-41, Para.8.
25 Ibid. Article III-304, Para. 1.
26 Ibid. Article I-26, Para. 8.
27 Ibid. Article III-313, Para. 3.
28 Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European
Union, Para. 10, at http://europa.eu.int/futurum/Constitution/
protocol/natparl_en.htm.
29 CIG 87/04, Article III-309, Para.1 (new tasks are shown in
italics).
30 Council Joint Action on the establishment of the European
Defence Agency, Brussels, L245/17, 12 July 2004, Article 5.
31 See Daniela Manca and Gerrard Quille, ‘The European
Armaments Agency: A Virtual Reality’, European Security
Review, No. 20, December 2003, p.2.
32 OCCAR, WEAG/WEAO and the LoI are, respectively, the
Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Arme-
ment, the Western European Armaments Group/Organisation
and the Letter of Intent Countries.
33 A Special Consultative Committee has been suggested, but
its precise functions remain unclear although it is clear that
it will not have decision-making power. This may provoke
complaints from Turkey who has complained of second-
class status, or exclusion, from CFSP.
34 The Commission has already produced a communication,
‘Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy’, in March 2003
and has made significant progress in opening up Commuity
research in the security and defence sector following the
recommendations of the ‘Group of Personalities’ who under-
lined the importance of research in this area, in conformity
with the Lisbon criteria and the Barcelona research and
development target.
35 CIG 87/04, Article I-41, Para. 6 & Article III-312, Para. 1.
36 Protocol on permanent structured cooperation established by
Articles I-40(6) and III-213 of the Constitution, at http://
www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/
rpt/2004/1860.html, Para. 1(a). Note that the Protocol refers to
CIG86/04, of 25 June 2004 and that correct Article number to
which the Protocol now refers are Articles I-41(6) and III-312.
37 Ibid. Para.1(b).
38 Ibid. Article I-41, Para. 5 & Article III-310, Paras. 1-2.
39 Treaty on European Union, Article 17, Para. 1 (emphasis
added).
40 CIG 87/04, Article I-41, Para. 2 (emphasis added).
41 Ibid. Loc cit.
42 Ibid., Article I-41, Para. 7.
43 A Secure Europe in a better world: European Security
Strategy (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, December
2003), p. 20. ❑